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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the health care system in the United States has come to be
dominated almost entirely by large health maintenance organizations [hereinafter
“HMOs”]1 and insurance providers. This trend has proven to deprive physicians of
their decision-making authority when it comes to the administration of care, with the
ultimate result of reducing the quality of health care services provided to consumers.
The market dominance enjoyed by these entities is primarily the product of the
current state and federal antitrust laws, which have effectively tied the hands of
independently practicing physicians by preventing them from banding together in
their contract negotiations with these types of managed care providers [hereinafter
“MCPs”].2 As such, a substantive change in our national antitrust laws is required in

1
HMOs are essentially legal entities that provide comprehensive health care for private
parties in return for scheduled advance payments at a predetermined fixed rate. See
COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: HEALTH
MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS CAN HELP CONTROL HEALTH CARE COSTS 1 (1980). HMOs
are not to be confused with PPOs, or preferred provider organizations, which are organizations
comprised of a select panel of health care providers that jointly market their services under
such pretences as greater cost efficiency, quality, and accessibility. See PEAT MARWICK,
DIMENSIONS IN HEALTH CARE 1 (1985).
2

PEAT MARWICK, supra note 1, at 1.
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order to equalize the imbalance of power between physicians and MCPs, and to
ensure the availability of the highest quality of care.
The text to follow is intended to provide an overview of the legal basis for the
imbalance of power currently inherent to the health care industry, suggesting several
reasons for its development. It also provides an outline of the current basis for
antitrust liability in this country and describes some possible solutions. The most
practical and effective means through which to rectify this imbalance would be to
enact new federal legislation that would amend the antitrust laws to allow for limited
“unionization” of independently practicing physicians for collective bargaining
purposes.
I. REASONS FOR THE IMBALANCE
A. Lack of Enforcement of Antitrust Laws Against HMOs
The bargaining position of independent physicians is substantially weakened by
the lack of significant enforcement of the antitrust laws by the Federal Trade
Commission [hereinafter “FTC”] and the Department of Justice [hereinafter “DOJ”]
against managed care and insurance companies. Even in the face of the considerable
market dominance in many localities by a single HMO, the federal enforcement
agencies charged with the enforcement of the antitrust laws seem reluctant to
interfere with their growth. In fact, Robert F. Liebenluft, former assistant director
for health care in the FTC’s Bureau of Competition, has reportedly stated that the
federal agencies “had rarely, if ever, challenged an HMO merger.”3 In some
markets, MPCs have amassed more than fifty percent of the health care market, yet
the FTC and the DOJ have done little more than rubber stamp the mergers and
acquisitions of these large health plans.4 This apparent lack of enforcement of the
antitrust laws against HMOs allows such entities to accumulate even greater
dominance in health care and serves to undermine the limited bargaining power that
independent physicians enjoy.
B. Limited Exemption From Antitrust Liability For Insurance Companies
Insurance companies are also treated in a more preferential light by the federal
government in regards to antitrust matters, thereby further weakening the bargaining
power of independent physicians and lessening their control over treatment of their
patients. In the United States, the regulation and taxation of the insurance business is
left primarily to the states.5 In 1945 the U.S. government enacted the McCarran3

Concern Rising About Health Plan Mergers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1999, at 1C.

4

E. Ratcliffe Anderson, Jr., M.D., Statement of the American Medical Association to the
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives (June 22, 1999), at 9 (stating
Alpha Center review of HMO market shares in twenty-five states revealed that the largest five
insurers control the care administered to more than 50% of the insured citizens of twenty-three
states and more than 70% of the insured citizens in sixteen of those states). Smaller, “local”
health plans have achieved similar market dominance in numerous localities. Id. at 5. For
example, Blue Cross has attained a market share of 57% in Philadelphia, Highmark has a
marker share of 66.4% and controls 96% of the HMO market in Pittsburgh, and Blue Cross
Blue Shield controls approximately 50% of the market in Rhode Island. Id.
5
Francis Achampong, The McCaran-Ferguson Act and the Limited Insurance Antitrust
Exemption: An Indefensible Aberation?, 15 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 141 (1991); see generally
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Ferguson Act.6 This legislation served to provide insurance companies with a
limited exemption from federal antitrust laws, to the extent that their activity is
covered by state law.7 However, this exemption does not shield insurance companies
from federal prosecution for acts that traditionally constitute violations of federal
antitrust law, such as boycotts, coercion, or intimidation.8
The Supreme Court has established a three-part test for determining whether the
actions of an insurance company should be construed as part of the “business of
insurance,” and, therefore, exempt from antitrust liability under the McCarranFerguson Act.9 This three-part standard requires the reviewing court to determine:
first, whether the activity transfers or spreads the insured’s risk; second, whether the
activity is an essential or integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer
and insured; and third, whether the activity or practice is limited to members within
the insurance field.10 Challenges to the states’ power to regulate and tax insurance
companies under the Commerce Clause following the enactment of this statute were
rejected and the right of the several states to regulate insurance was affirmed.11
This industry friendly legislation has justifiably received some criticism. As
previously stated, the McCarran-Ferguson Act only applies to the insurance business,
providing insurance companies with statutory immunity under the federal antitrust
laws not granted to any other major industry.12 However, there does not seem to be
any valid reason why the insurance industry should enjoy this unique preferential
treatment.
It arguable that this exemption actually serves to restrict competition by allowing
for data sharing and concerted rate determination. This legislation also opens the
door to possible collective raising of rates or premiums. The added leverage that the
McCarran-Ferguson Act provides insurance companies over individual health care
providers and patients has also been noticed by many members of Congress,
evidenced by the listing of this effect of the Act in the findings of Congress in the

SEC v. Nat’l Sec. Inc., 343 U.S. 453 (1980); Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co.,
440 U.S. 205 (1979).
6
McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015
(1988)).
7

§ 1013(a). Section 1012(b) provides that “no Act of Congress shall be construed to
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any state for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance, . . . unless such Act specifically relates to the business of
insurance. . . .” § 1012(b).
8

§ 1013(b). (providing that “(b) Nothing contained in this Act shall render said Sherman
Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate or act of boycott, coersion
or intimidation. . .”).
9

See Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 440 U.S. at 229-30.

10

Id.

11

See generally FTC v. Travelers Health Ass’n, 362 U.S. 293 (1960); Wilburn Boat Co. v.
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409
(1954); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
12

See Achampong, supra note 5, at 141.
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recently proposed bill referred to as the Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 1999.13
Essentially, the McCarran-Ferguson Act unnecessarily provides added bargaining
power, though limited, to insurance companies, thereby further hampering
physicians in contract negotiations.
II. OPPOSITION TO UNIONIZATION OF PHYSICIANS
A. Basis For Antitrust Liability
To date, attempts by independent physicians to pool together to lessen this
imbalance of power within the health care industry have been met by strong
resistance. A principle argument of those opposed to such efforts seems to be that
such a unionization of doctors would serve to stifle competition within the health
care arena, fattening the pockets of already overpaid physicians and yet not
significantly improving the quality of care provided to patients. Fear of striking
physicians and the resulting unavailability of medical services, particularly
emergency care, undoubtedly to greatly fuel the opposition.
Accordingly,
physicians’ efforts to unite for collective bargaining purposes have been viciously
attacked as violations of the antitrust laws.
The free trade and unrestrained competition are central to American capitalism,
and have led to the development and staunch enforcement of the antitrust laws.14
The Supreme Court of the United States has maintained that faith in the value of
competition is at the heart of our national economic policy15 and described the
antitrust laws as the “Magna Carta of free enterprise.”16 These laws reflect the
widely accepted belief that competition generally serves to promote the efficient
allocation of resources, enabling consumers to have access to the highest quality
goods and services at the lowest possible prices.17 The antitrust laws are also
generally thought to ensure greater freedom of choice in the market, promoting
increased quality, service, safety, durability, and immediate cost.18 Consumer
preferences, rather than a competitor’s abuse of market power, are intended to
control the success or failure of one’s business.19
13

See Suhail Khan, H.R. 1304: Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 1999, at
<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query>.
14
See Nancy K. Whittemore, Antitrust Enforcement and Health Care Reform, 32 HOUS. L.
REV. 1493 (1996). The United States Supreme Court has gone as far as to analogize the
relationship between the antitrust laws and the preservation of economic freedom and the freeenterprise system to the Bill of Rights and the protection of personal freedom. United States
v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
15

Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951).

16

Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596.

17

See David L. Meyer & Charles F. Rule, Health Care Collaboration Does Not Require
Substantive Antitrust Reform, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 169 (1994); see also Nat’l Soc’y of
Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
18

Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 695.

19

See Antitrust Issues in the Health Care Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Medicare and Long-Term Care of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 103d Cong. 66 (1993)
[hereinafter “Antitrust Hearings”].
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Ironically, the antitrust laws were intended to help entrepreneurs compete on a
level playing field by condemning anti-competitive behavior.20 However, today they
serve as ammunition against private practitioners within health care, actually
preventing them from having the opportunity to compete on the same level as the
insurance companies and HMOs, which have come to dominate the industry.
Antitrust liability was originally a common law concept but has since been
codified and thereby incorporated into positive law.21 The principal federal antitrust
statutes are the Sherman Act of 1890,22 the Clayton Act,23 enacted in 1914 and
substantially amended by the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936,24 and the Federal Trade
Commission Act of 1914.25
The Sherman Act serves to make contracts, combinations or conspiracies in
restraint of trade, void at common law, unlawful in the positive sense.26 It also
created a civil cause of action for damages in favor of those injured by the actions of
another party that violate its provisions.27 The act is commonly employed to prevent
or estop agreements to fix prices,28 conspiracies amongst competitors to boycott
other parties,29 and the use of coercion to restrain open competition.30
20

Id. at 70.

21

Combinations in restraint of trade or tending to create or maintain monopoly gave rise to
actions at common law. Rogers v. Douglas Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc., 244 F.2d 471 (D.C.
Cir. 1957); see also Mans v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 352 F. Supp. 1095 (N.D. Okla. 1971)
(providing that federal statutory law on monopolies did not supplant common law but
incorporated it).
22

15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).

23

§§ 12-27.

24

The Robinson-Patman Act amended the Clayton Act and added §§ 13a, 13b, and 21a to
title 15. Paceco, Inc. v. Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Indus. Co., Ltd., 468 F. Supp. 256 (N.D.
Cal. 1979).
25

15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1994).

26

Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1962). Section One
of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part that: “(e)very contract, combination the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is hereby declared to be
illegal.” 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). Section Two of the Act further provides that: “(e)very person
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce . . . shall be deemed guilty
of a felony. . . .” § 2.
27

See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978).

28

See, e.g., Ariz. v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (holding that
agreements among doctors that established the maximum fees to be claimed as payment for
particular services rendered amounted to an illegal price-fixing conspiracy prohibited by the
Sherman Act); Goldfarb v.Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (finding that the establishment
of a minimum fee schedule, published by the county bar association and enforced by the state
bar, constituted illegal price-fixing).
29
See, e.g., Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786 (3d Cir.1984) (holding the denial of staff
privileges to osteopathic physicians by the staff of Weiss Hospital constituted a per se
violation of the Sherman Act); Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 895 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
496 U.S. 982 (1990) (finding that the boycott of chiropractic physicians by the American
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The elements that must be proven to establish a claim under the Sherman Act are:
a contract, combination or conspiracy; which unreasonably restrained trade under the
per se rule of illegality or rule of reason analysis; and affected interstate commerce
or injured competition.31 It is also necessary that the plaintiff be able to demonstrate
that the injury to his business or property was the direct result of the defendants’
actions in restraint of trade, and said damages must be reasonably ascertainable and
not merely speculative.32
The Clayton Act is geared more toward preventing the development of unfair
market conditions that serve to foster monopolies or deter competition.33 The United
States Supreme Court has interpreted the congressional intent underlining this Act,
stating that through enactment of this section, Congress
sought generally to obviate price discrimination practices threatening
independent merchants and businessmen, presumably, from whatever
source, and intended to assure, to the extent reasonably practicable, that
businessmen at the same functional level would start on equal competitive
footing so far as price was concerned.34
The Act focuses upon several types of restraints of trade, including exclusive
dealing arrangements and price discriminations, and provides a civil remedy for
Medical Association amounted to unreasonable restraint of trade forbidden under Section One
of the Sherman Act).
30
See, e.g., FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (finding that the policy
adhered to by the members of the Indiana Federation of Dentists of refusing to relinquish xrays to insurers established an unreasonable restraint of trade prohibited by the Sherman Act).
31

Spence v. S.E. Alaska Pilots’ Ass’n, 789 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Alaska 1992). See also
Mowery v. Standard Oil Co. of Ohio, 463 F. Supp. 762 (N.D. Ohio 1976), aff’d 590 F.2d 335
(6th Cir. 1978); Unibrand Tire & Prod. Co., Inc. v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 429 F. Supp. 470
(W.D.N.Y. 1977); N. C. Elec. Membership Corp. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 85 F.R.D.
249 (M.D.N.C. 1979); Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of Ku Klux Klan, 518 F.
Supp. 993 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
32

Wilder Enter., Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 632 F.2d 1135 (4th Cir. 1980). See
also Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Codding, 615 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1980), on remand 501 F. Supp.
155 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Sun Dun, Inc. of Wash. v. Coca-Cola Co., 740 F. Supp. 381 (D. Md.
1990).
33
FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963). See also FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363
U.S. 536 (1960), on remand 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961) (providing that the Clayton Act,
which serves to forbid price discriminations where the effect may be to substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, was originally enacted to
curb use by financially powerful corporations of localized price-cutting tactics that impaired
competitive position of other sellers). See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1994). Section 13 of
the Act provides in pertinent follows: “It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in
commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in
price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality. . . .” § 13(a). In
addition, § 13(f) provides: “It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price which is
prohibited by this section.” § 13(f).
34

FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, reh’g denied 364 U.S. 854 (1960). See also
Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962).
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those injured by parties who violate it.35 Essentially, this legislation was enacted to
curb and prohibit all devices through which large buyers gained discriminatory
preferences over smaller ones by virtue of their greater purchasing power.36
While not identical to the Sherman Act, the tests for illegality under these two
Acts are complementary.37 The principle distinction between the two is that the
Sherman Act makes illegal monopolies and agreements in restraint of trade that have
already manifested themselves fully, while the Clayton Act serves to strike down
discriminatory and anti-competitive practices at their incipiency, before they have
had the opportunity to reach the dimensions of Sherman Act violations.38
In 1936, the Clayton Act was significantly altered by the Robinson-Patman Act.39
The Robinson-Patman is generally thought to be a response to perceived increases in
market power and coercive practices by large purchasers or buying groups over their
smaller independent competitors.40 The primary purpose of the Act seems to be to
protect independent business persons by eliminating the competitive advantages of
larger market entities that result from their superior purchasing power.41 Unlike
actions under the Sherman Act, in which it need only be demonstrated that the
transactions complained of have affected interstate commerce, to successfully bring a
claim under the Robinson-Patman Act, it is necessary to allege and prove that the
actions in restraint of trade complained of are actually in interstate commerce.42
Although on its face the Robinson-Patman Act might appear to be the ideal
mechanism through which independent physicians might be able to combat the
market dominance and competitive advantages of HMOs and insurance companies,
to date, it has not been an effective means to achieve that end.
Finally, the Federal Trade Commission Act serves as a catch-all enactment for
antitrust regulation. It empowers the FTC to enforce the antitrust laws embodied in
the aforementioned Acts and, essentially, fills the gaps left open by the seemingly
35

See Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166.

36

Id.

37

See United States v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (providing that §§ 1-7
and 12-27 of this title do not embody inconsistent policy approaches and are not unrelated to
each other, but tests of illegality under such sections are complementary).
38
See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); see also
United States Besser Mfg. Co., 96 F. Supp. 304 (S.D. Mich. 1951), aff’d 343 U.S. 444 (1952)
(maintaining that §§ 12-27 of this title aim to strike down a monopoly at its inception, when
the first step is taken, and §§ 1-7 of this title aim to strike down a monopoly after it has
become more virile).
39

See FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968); Nat’l Dairy Prod. Corp. v. FTC, 395
F.2d 517 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 393 U.S. 977 (1968); Lago & Sons Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood,
Inc., 892 F. Supp. 325 (D.N.H. 1995), reconsideration granted 937 F. Supp. 107 (1996).
40

Yeager's Fuel, Inc. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 953 F. Supp. 617 (E.D. Pa. 1997).

41
See FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., Inc., 360 U.S. 55, reh’g denied 361 U.S. 855 (1959)
(holding that the Robinson-Patman Act was enacted to eliminate inequities resulting from
competitive advantages obtained by large purchasers from special services or facilities).
42
See Lewis v. Shell Oil Co., 50 F. Supp. 547 (N.D. Ill. 1943); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Blade, 110 F. Supp. 96 (S.D. Cal. 1953), appeal dismissed sub nom. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Metro. Engravers, Ltd., 245 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1956).
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more explicit regulatory statutes described above.43 The Act also makes it unlawful
to engage in unfair methods of competition or deceptive practices in or affecting
commerce.44 Much like all of the aforementioned antitrust legislation, the Act seems
to be directed primarily toward combating the evils thought to be associated with
conspiracies in restraint of trade and monopolization.
B. Enforcement of Antitrust Laws
The federal antitrust laws are primarily enforced by the FTC and the antitrust
division of the DOJ, though private parties can also bring actions under those
provisions.45 In applying these laws to the facts of a particular case, the actions of
the entity in question are either determined to be per se violations or are analyzed
under what is referred to as the “rule of reason.”46 Agreements among competitors
that clearly serve to fix prices or allocate markets are generally deemed to be per se
illegal.47 This per se rule is enforced uniformly across all forms of industry48 and is
not rendered inapplicable simply because the alleged justification for the agreement
in question is to promote competition.49 Similarly, economic justifications for the
fixing of prices or arguments that the established prices are reasonable, or even
beneficial to consumers, will not serve to protect a given party from liability.50 One
might be surprised to learn that the per se rule has even served to invalidate price-

43

15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1994). Section 41 of the this Act provides in pertinent part as
follows: “A commission is created and established, to be known as the Federal Trade
Commission. . . .” § 41.
44
§ 45(a)(1). See also Antitrust Hearings, supra note 19, at 66 (prepared statement of
James C. Egan, Jr.).
45

See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, 12-27, 41-58 (1994).

46

See generally ROBERT KLEIN, DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMM’N STATEMENTS
(1996).

OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE
47

See United States v. Socony-Vaccuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 213 (1940) (holding that
any combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing,
pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal
per se under the Sherman Act); Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980).
48
Socony-Vaccuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 222. See also Ariz. v. Maricopa County Med’l
Soc’y, 643 F.2d 563, 564 (9th Cir. 1982) (expressing that there is nothing in the nature of the
medical profession or the health care industry in general that would warrant their exemption
from per se rules for price fixing); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 778 (1975); Nat’l
Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 696.
49

Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332.

50

See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1890), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1898); Nat’l Soc’y
of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 689 (rejecting the argument that competitors may lawfully agree
to sell their goods at an established price so long as the agreed-upon price is reasonable);
Catalano, Inc., 446 U.S. at 647; Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, at 226 (maintaining
that all price-fixing agreements are banned, regardless of their justification, because of their
actual or potential threat to the central nervous system of the economy).
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fixing agreements that established the maximum fees to be charged for particular
services.51
The per se rule has also been employed to invalidate agreements made between
groups of physicians.52 A noteworthy example of this is Arizona v. Maricopa County
Medical Society, a case involving alleged price-fixing agreements that was reviewed
by the United States Supreme Court.53 In Maricopa County, the member doctors of
the Maricopa County Medical Society in Arizona made an agreement through which
they established the maximum fees that could be charged for specific health services
rendered to policy holders of specified insurance plans.54 The Court found that this
agreement violated the per se rule because it constituted a price restraint that
provided for the same economic rewards for all practitioners, regardless of their
relative skill, experience, training, or willingness to engage in novel medical
procedures.55 It also speculated that this type of agreement could serve to discourage
entry of competitors into the market and might deter experimentation and new
developments within the industry.56 This case demonstrates the real potential that
agreements made between physicians concerning the fees to be charged for particular
services rendered will be found violative of the antitrust laws.
Currently, most alleged agreements in restraint of trade seem to be analyzed
under the rule of reason. Under this approach, it is possible for some agreements
which actually do result in limited restraint of trade to still be found to be valid, even
though they might justifiably be classified as per se violations of the antitrust laws.57
In analyzing a particular agreement, the court first attempts to determine whether the
formation and operation of the joint venture or network in question has a substantial
anti-competitive effect.58 If it is found to have such an effect, that potential impact is
then weighed against any pro-competitive efficiencies which might result
therefrom.59 Legality, therefore, rests to a great extent upon whether the restraint
imposed is such that it merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition,
or whether it serves to suppress or even destroy competition.
In making such a determination, the court ordinarily considers numerous factors.
Among those factors most often reviewed are: the specific facts peculiar to the
business in question, the condition of the relevant market before the alleged restraint
was introduced, and the nature of the restraint in question and its actual or probable
effect on the market.60 Agreements, or express or implied contracts, that are found to
51
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. at 345. See also Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Albreckt v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
52

See, e.g., Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332.

53

Id.

54

Id. at 335.

55

Id. at 348.

56

Id.

57

See United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898).

58

See KLEIN, supra note 46, at 66.

59

Id.

60

Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).

232

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 15:223

be likely to produce significant efficiencies that benefit consumers and any pricing
agreements determined to be reasonably necessary to realize those efficiencies, will
most likely be found to be legal under the rule of reason.61 The key for physicians,
therefore, is to persuasively demonstrate that their particular agreements or networks
actually serve to create a benefit to the consumer that outweighs the detriment
resulting from any restraint of competition.62 Therein lies another substantial
obstacle to physician unionization.
C. Limited Labor Exemption
While the federal antitrust laws generally serve to prohibit agreements that are in
restraint of trade, a limited exception has been established that enables employees to
organize for contract bargaining purposes in a manner that would technically violate
such laws. This was principally achieved through the enactment of the National
Labor Relations Act [hereinafter “NLRA”] in 1935.63 This legislation was enacted in
response to the perceived inequality of bargaining power between employees and
their employers.64 It sought to level the playing field by conferring certain
affirmative rights on employees and by placing certain enumerated restrictions on the
activities of employers.65
The fundamental purpose of the NLRA has been described as to promote
industrial peace and stability by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining.66 The manifest objective to be obtained through collective bargaining67
61

Id.

62

KLEIN, supra note 46, at 64.

63

29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994). The Act serves to create the National Labor Relations
Board and empowers it to: “prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice
affecting consumers.” § 160.
64

See Fafnir Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1966) (holding that this
subchapter was designed to overcome the inequality of bargaining power between employees
and employers).
65

See Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).

66
See Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964); Bloom v. NLRB, 603 F.2d
1015 (5th Cir. 1979) (maintaining that the intent of the Act is to minimize industrial strife and
to promote industrial stability through collective bargaining); NLRB v. Laney & Duke Storage
Warehouse Co., 424 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1970) (stating that the purpose of this subchapter is to
promote settlement of labor disputes through collective bargaining); NLRB v. Air Control
Prods. of St. Petersburg, Inc., 335 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1964) (maintaining that this subchapter is
designed to facilitate industrial peace through encouraging collective bargaining); NLRB v.
Pincus Bros., Inc.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding that the fundamental policy
of this subchapter is to encourage collective bargaining and the industrial stability flowing
therefrom); Int’l Bd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Mobil Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 482 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1973).
67

Collective bargaining is defined by the Act as:
the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party.
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is the formation of binding contracts between employees and labor organizations.68
To facilitate this collective bargaining, the NLRA allows for employees to unite and
to select a union, by majority vote, that will serve as their bargaining
representative.69 However, by safeguarding the right of employees to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining, Congress did not intend
to weaken the underlying contractual bonds and loyalties between employers and
employees.70 On the contrary, the underlying purpose of the Act is to strengthen,
rather than weaken, the cooperation and functional relationship between the
employer and the employed.71 In reviewing the purpose of the NLRA, the United
States Supreme Court has stated that,
[this subchapter] is aimed at encouraging the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining and at protecting the exercise by workers of full
freedom of association, of self-organization, and of negotiating the terms
and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection
through their freely chosen representatives.72
Section 157 of the NLRA specifically defines the right of employees to organize
and bargain collectively, stating in pertinent part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and
shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except
to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.73
29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994).
68

NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939). See also NLRB v. Scullin Steel Co.,
161 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1947); NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.
1943); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938). See also H.K. Porter Co.
v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970) (stating that one of the fundamental policies of the NLRA is
freedom of contract).
69
Cox v. C.H. Masland & Sons, Inc., 607 F.2d 138 (1979). See also NLRB v. Milk
Drivers and Dairy Employees, Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162 (2d Cir. 1976) (maintaining that this
subchapter was designed to permit workers to freely exercise the right to join unions, to be
active or passive members, or to abstain from joining any union at all without imperiling their
right to a livelihood).
70

NLRB v. Knuth Bros., Inc., 537 F.2d 950 (7th Cir. 1976).

71

Id.

72

NLRB v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 120 F.2d 262, cert. denied 314 U.S. 693 (1941).
See also S.S. Pennock Co. v. Ferretti, 201 Misc. 563 (N.Y. 1951), rev’d 128 N.Y.S.2d 749
(1954), 283 A.D. 527 (1954), motion dismissed 286 A.D. 964 (1955) (arising in New York in
which the purpose of this subchapter was identified as to encourage the practice and procedure
of collective bargaining, and to protect the exercise by employees of full freedom of
association, organization and designation of representatives of their own choosing).
73

29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
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This statute was essentially meant to level the playing field within the labor
market by granting employees whatever advantage they would get from collective
pressure upon their employer.74 It was hoped that the Act would serve to eliminate
the ability of employers to use brute force to dominate labor disputes.75
In light of the underlying philosophy of the NLRA and its express purpose of
facilitating collective bargaining, one might logically assume that the Act would
serve to insulate independent physicians from antitrust liability when they attempt to
unite for the purposes of collective bargaining. However, the myriad of instances
arising throughout the United States in which this issue has been addressed seem to
demonstrate that this is simply not the case. The principle obstacle for physicians
has been their inability to be classified as an appropriate bargaining unit by the
National Labor Relations Board [hereinafter “Board” or “NLRB”], and thus afforded
protection under the NLRA.
Under the NLRA, once a specific group has been certified by the Board as an
appropriate bargaining unit, the group’s employer becomes obligated to negotiate
with unit representatives in good faith.76 These bargaining units are referred to in the
statutory language as “labor organizations.”77 In establishing the appropriateness of
such a unit, the Board seems to focus primarily upon whether or not the employees
of the unit can establish a discernable “community-of-interests.”78
This
“community-of-interests” can be demonstrated by similarities amongst members of
the group in regards to such things as the extent of interaction with other employees,
wages, working hours, and the extent of common supervision.79 Although the
language of the Act and relevant case law has helped to identify the characteristics of
bargaining groups required by the Board for certification as an appropriate
bargaining unit, analysis must still be made on a case-by-case-basis.
74

Art Metals Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 110 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1940).

75

NLRB v. Del.-N.J. Ferry Co., 90 F.2d 520 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 302 U.S. 738 (1937).

76

See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994); see also NLRB v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 120 F.2d
1004 (3d Cir. 1941) (providing that this subchapter manifests intent that employer bargain
collectively in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of
employment, and “good faith” essential to the bargaining function is rendered impossible
where employer has foreclosed in advance any possibility of agreement); E.I. Du Pont De
Nemours & Co. v. NLRB, 116 F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1940), cert. denied 313 U.S. 571 (1941)
(finding that the Act’s fundamental purpose is fulfilled when it is established that the employer
acted in genuine good faith).
77

See 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1994) (“The term ‘labor organization’ means any organization
of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees
participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or
conditions of work.”).
78

John Robert Shelton, NLRB Guidelines for Determining Health Care Indus. Bargaining
Units: Judicial Acceptance or Back to the Drawing Board, 78 KY. L.J. 143, 150 (1990). See
also Leigh Anne Flavin, The Thomas-Davis Cases: The Appropriateness of Physicians as
Bargaining Units and the Possible Implications for Insurance Companies Under the National
Labor Relations Act, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 811 (1998).
79

Id. See also Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 239 NLRB 872, 873 (1978); Shelton, supra note 78,
at 150-51.
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In 1989, the NLRB greatly clarified this issue by exercising its substantial rulemaking authority and actually listed the types of bargaining units within the health
care industry that it deemed to be appropriate.80 The validity of this rule, and the
Board’s authority to create it, have been upheld by the United States Supreme
Court.81 While physicians are listed among the eight enumerated combinations of
appropriate bargaining units under this rule, groups of independent practitioners are
not necessarily protected.
To be insulated from antitrust liability by the NLRA, independent physicians
must be classified as members of the class intended to be protected by the Act,
specifically that of the employee.82 This protected class has been described as
working men in crafts and unskilled labor.83 It was hoped that the enactment of this
legislation would enable employees to bargain collectively, so that they might be
able to attain adequate wages for services rendered, fair working conditions, and job
security.84
The express language of the NLRA confirms that it was designed primarily to
protect “employees” and “professional employees.”85 It also specifically excludes

80
See 29 C.F.R. § 103.30 (1998). Section 103.30 provides in pertinent part as follows:
Except in extraordinary circumstances and in circumstances where there are existing
non-conforming units, the following shall be the appropriate units, and the only
appropriate units, for petitions filed pursuant to section 9(c)(1)(A)(i) or 9(c)(1)(B) of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, except that, if sought by labor
organizations, various combinations of units may be appropriate:
(1)
All registered nurses.
(2)
All physicians.
(3)
All professionals except for registered nurses and physicians.
(4)
All technical employees.
(5)
All skilled maintenance employees.
(6)
All business office clerical employees.
(7)
All guards.
(8)
All nonprofessional employees except for technical employees, skilled
maintenance employees, business office clerical employees, and guards. Provided that
a unit of five or fewer employees shall constitute an extraordinary circumstance.
(b) Where extraordinary circumstances exist, the Board shall determine
appropriate units by adjudication.
Id. (emphasis added)
81

See Evans v. Am. Fed’n of Television and Radio Artists, 354 F. Supp. 823, 847
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev’d on other grounds 496 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied 419 U.S.
1093 (1974), reh’g denied 420 U.S. 956 (1975).
82

Id.

83

Id.

84

Id.

85

See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1994). Section 152(3) provides:
The term “employee” shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the
employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise,
and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in
connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and
who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but
shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic
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several enumerated classes of individuals, including independent contractors and
supervisors.86 Unfortunately for private practitioners, the nature of their profession is
such that they are often classified as either independent contractors or supervisors.87
As a result, they are often not included within the protected class of the
“employee.”88
Although independently practicing physicians have traditionally been classified
as independent contractors, such a determination is not automatic.89 Case law in this
area demonstrates that physicians can, in some instances, be deemed to be
employees, warranting of antitrust protection.90 The Board, as well as reviewing
courts, consider a variety of factors in determining whether an individual should be
classified as an employee or an independent contractor, including common law
agency principles and the decision-making authority and relative autonomy of the
individual in question.91 As such, employee status must be determined on a case-bycase basis.
While the employee requirement of the NLRA has proved to be a prohibitive
barrier for most physicians seeking to unite for collective bargaining purposes,
proponents of physicians unions have attempted to challenge the traditional
classification of physicians as independent contractors.92 For example, in 1998,
representatives of the United Food and Commercial Workers Union successfully
convinced the Board to reconsider the employment status of several hundred

service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent
or spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any
individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer
subject to the Railway Labor Act [§ 45 U.S.C. 151 et seq.], as amended from time to
time, or by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined.
§ 152(3) (emphasis added). Section 152(12) provides:
The term “professional employee” means—
(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in
character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work;
(ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance;
(iii) of such a character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be
standardized in relation to a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an
advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged
course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher
learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education or from an
apprenticeship or from training in the performance of routine mental, manual, or
physical processes.
§ 152(12)(a).
86

See generally, Vizciano v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1996).

87

See Shelton, supra note 78.

88

Id.

89

Id. (finding that freelancing professionals who though they were independent contractors
were actually employees).
90

See Flavin, supra note 78, at 828.

91

Id.

92

Id.

2000-01]

STIFLING OF COMPETITION

237

independent physicians in New Jersey.93 The Board Chairman ordered a full hearing
to determine the employee or independent contractor status of the physicians,
stressing that every aspect of the relationship between the alleged employee and the
alleged employer should be considered.94 The Board looked beyond the mere
contractual relationship between the parties and seemed to place significant emphasis
upon the amount of control exercised over access to patients.95 The rationale
employed by the Board in this case seems to suggest that the barrier to collective
bargaining by independent physicians, embodied in the employee requirement of the
NLRA, might be beginning to deteriorate.
The NLRA, as it was originally enacted, did not exclude supervisors96 from the
class of individuals potentially deserving of protection under the Act.97 Accordingly,
the Board initially allowed for supervisors to be counted in the class of employees.98
However, the Board soon developed a realization of the substantial differences
between the interests, roles, and duties of supervisors and those of employees.99 In
1947, Congress amended the Act to expressly exclude “supervisors” from its
protection.100 As such, even those physicians who manage to escape classification as
an independent contractor, could be, and quite often are, determined to be
“supervisors” for purposes of the NLRA, and therefore barred from its antitrust
protection.
III. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?
It should be clear from the analysis of the federal antitrust laws above, that the
cards are substantially stacked against independently practicing physicians who wish
to unite to collectively bargain with insurance providers and managed care
organizations. Our emphasis must now turn to what must be done to remedy this
situation without running afoul of the antitrust laws.
Several options seem to present themselves. Doctors could simply resign to
being labeled as independent contractors or supervisors and continue to be bullied by

93

Id.

94

See NLRB: Divided NLRB Orders Full Hearing on UFCW Petition for HMO Physicians,
174 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Sept. 9, 1998.
95

See id.; see also AmeriHealth Inc., 362 NLRB No. 55 (1998).

96

The term “supervisor” as defined by the NLRA includes: “. . . any individual having
authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote,
discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to
adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the
foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but
requires the use of independent judgment.” 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1994).
97

See Christopher J. Lawhorn, NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp.: One Less
Hurdle to Finding “Supervisor” Status, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 619 (1995).
98
See In re Codchaux Sugars, 44 NLRB 874 (1942); In re Unio Colliers Coal Co., 41
NLRB 961 (1942).
99

See In re Colonial Press, 50 NLRB 823 (1943); In re Maryland Drydock Co., 49 NLRB
733 (1943).
100

29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994).
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insurance companies and HMOs. They might alternatively pray for Big Brother to
step in and establish a national health care system fully regulated by the federal
government. However, neither of these options seem very desirable.
Instead, physicians could adopt a more proactive approach. One possible option
would be to attempt to structure their bargaining alliances in such a way that they
comport to the limited latitude afforded by the antitrust laws and the enforcement
policy of the FTC and DOJ. Alternatively, relief for physicians might be provided
through the enactment of new legislation, either at the state or federal level, which
expressly provides for antitrust exemptions for groups of independently practicing
physicians. Among three viable options, the interests of all affected parties would
best be served through the enactment of federal legislation, as the federal preemption
over state law will prove to establish relative uniformity of enforcement throughout
the country.
A. Viable Option 1: Attempt to Comply With Current Antitrust Laws
Simple solutions quite often turn out to be the best ones. Accordingly, a very
logical and reasonable means through which physicians might legally improve their
bargaining positions would be to simply design their particular bargaining alliances
in accordance with the limited leeway allotted by the antitrust laws and their primary
enforcers. Considerable guidance for such efforts can be found in the Statement of
Antitrust Enforcement Policy issued by the DOJ and FTC in August of 1996.101
The 1996 Policy Statement specifically addresses physician organizations,
referred to therein as “physician network joint ventures,” and identifies the
characteristics of the types of groups with which the DOJ and FTC will likely not
interfere.102
The statement provides that, in the absence of extraordinary
circumstances, neither agency will interfere with exclusive physician network joint
ventures103 whose physician participants share substantial financial risk, and
comprise no more than twenty percent of the physicians within each specialty having
active staff privileges and practicing within a given geographic market.104 Similarly,
in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, both agencies will refrain from
challenging non-exclusive physician network joint ventures105 where the physician
participants share substantial financial risk and constitute no more than thirty percent
of the physicians from each specialty with active staff privileges practicing within a
given geographic market.106 These types of physicians groups are described by the
agencies as functioning within antitrust “safety zones.”107
The Policy Statement justifies the risk-sharing requirement common to both of
the aforementioned antitrust “safety zones” by maintaining that such a requirement
provides physicians with an incentive to cooperate in controlling costs and
101

KLEIN, supra note 46.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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KLEIN, supra note 46.
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Id.
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improving the quality of care that they provide.108 These “safety zones” are not
absolute, however, and physician groups that do not conform perfectly to their basic
requirements might yet be found to be unlawful.109 Physicians intending to form
these types of organizations can actually obtain advisory opinions from the FTC, or
business reviews from the DOJ, prior to establishing their proposed union, by
submitting specified information to those agencies.110 As such, not only do
physicians have the agencies’ Policy Statement to serve as a guide, but they also
have the option of submitting proposals to the agencies in advance so that they might
be able to rectify any potential problems prior to any legal proceeding.
The most recent case law dealing with this issue demonstrates that the two most
readily available means through which physicians groups can engage in some degree
of collaborative negotiating without violating the antitrust laws are either to obtain
approval from the DOJ to operate a “Qualified Managed Care Plan” [hereinafter
“QMPC”] or to adopt what is referred to as a “messenger model” approach.111 To
receive approval to operate as a QMPC, a physicians group must essentially comply
with the DOJ Policy Statement discussed above.112 While there seems to be some
variance in the particular requirements from case to case, the essential characteristics
of acceptable physicians groups include the sharing of substantial risk by the
member physicians and comprising a small proportion of the relevant market,
typically no more than thirty percent.
The term “messenger model” refers to a means through which groups of
independent physicians can jointly market their services to managed care
providers.113 This approach basically involves employing a third party to act as a sort
of go-between, facilitating the exchange of information between individual
physicians and those who purchase their services.114 This approach does not,
however, allow for collective negotiations or any other collusive behavior of that
sort.115 It simply provides a means through which managed care providers can gain
access, through the third party “messenger,” to the fees which individual doctors are
willing to accept for the performance of a particular service, without having to deal
directly with each individual physician.116 The third party serves to benefit the
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Id.
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Id.
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KLEIN, supra note 46.
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See generally Dep’t of Justice Notice in re United States v. Woman’s Hosp. Found., 61
Fed. Reg. 43380-02 (Aug. 22, 1996); Dep’t of Justice Notice in re United States v. Health
Care Partners, Inc., 60 Fed.Reg. 52014-01 (Oct. 4, 1995); Dep’t of Justice Notice in re United
States v. Health Choice of Mo., Inc., 60 Fed. Reg. 51808-02 (Oct. 3, 1995) [hereinafter,
collectively “Dep’t of Justice Notices”].
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See Dep’t of Justice Notices, supra note 114.
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physicians, in turn, by marketing their services and accepting offers from MCPs on
their behalf that fall within a predetermined range of acceptable fees.117
While designing physicians organizations in accordance with the leeway allotted
by the antitrust laws is a viable option, legislative intervention would be preferable.
The guidance provided by the language of the antitrust statutes, relevant case law,
and the Policy Statement of the DOJ and FTC, while helpful, is not clear or definite
enough for physicians to be able to decipher and rely upon when creating collective
bargaining units. There is still room in the law for subjective interpretation and
analysis of factual considerations, both of which tend to lead to litigation. The
enactment of a clear and definitive statutory provision, on the other hand, would
greatly simplify this area of the law, providing physicians with the requisite guidance
to establish legal bargaining groups and potentially reducing the amount of litigation
in this area.
B. Viable Option 2: Let the Individual States Handle the Problem
It is arguable that the evils currently inherent to the health care industry could
best be remedied through state action, rather than through federal intervention.
Many state legislatures have already taken the initiative and begun to propose, and in
some cases to enact, new legislation geared toward bridging the gap among
physicians and managed care providers and insurance companies.118 Such efforts are
undoubtedly motivated in no small part by the lobbying efforts of local medical
associations.
Texas has recently adopted legislation that enables individual physicians to join
to negotiate with managed care providers under the supervision of the State.119 On
June 20, 1999, Texas Governor George W. Bush signed Senate Bill 1468, often
referred to as the “Physician Negotiation Bill,” stating that it would serve to level the
playing field between independent physicians and managed care organizations when
it comes to determining the quality of care for patients.120 Proponents of this Bill
117

Id.
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See generally TIM MAGLIONE, MEMORANDUM
ACTION” LEGISLATION (1999).
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Id.
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1999 Legislative Compendium: Market Fairness/Managed Care Reform, at
<http:www.texmed.org> [hereinafter “1999 Legislative Compendium”]. TEX. INS. CODE ANN.
§ 29.01 provides as follows:
The legislature finds that joint negotiation by competing physicians of certain terms
and conditions of contracts with health plans will result in pro-competitive effects in
the absence of any express or implied threat of retaliatory joint action, such as a
boycott or strike, by physicians. Although the legislature finds that joint negotiations
over fee-related terms may in some circumstances yield anticompetitive effects, it also
recognizes that there are instances in which health plans dominate the market to such a
degree that fair negotiations between physicians and the plan are unobtainable absent
any joint action on behalf of physicians. In these instances, health plans have the
ability to virtually dictate the terms of the contracts they offer physicians.
Consequently, the legislature finds it appropriate and necessary to authorize joint
negotiations on fee-related and other issues where it determines that such imbalances
exist.
§ 29.01.
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maintain that it will allow physicians to better protect their own rights, as well as
those of their patients.121 Since this new legislation was only recently enacted, no
significant conclusions can yet be made concerning its effects upon the health care
community within that state or the quality of care received by its citizens. However,
it is likely that this novel legislation will have a considerable impact upon not only
Texas, but upon other states that might now attempt to pursue similar legislation in
hopes of restoring fairness health care.
This newly enacted statute is codified in Chapter 29 of the Texas Insurance Code,
as “Joint Negotiations by Physicians with Health Benefit Plans.”122 It permits
individual, competing physicians to collectively negotiate with managed care
organizations so long as the group of physicians does not comprise more than ten
percent of the physicians in the health plan’s service area or dominate a particular
medical specialty.123 The physicians are to designate a third party to represent their
interests in the negotiations, during which time the health benefit plans maintain the
right to make offers to, or even enter into contracts with other competing individual
physicians.124 However, before the negotiations can even commence, the parties
must receive the approval of the state attorney general, who must review the request
for joint negotiations to ensure that it is reasonable and that the likely benefits of
such negotiations will not be outweighed by any harm caused by the reduction of
competition.125 Physicians are also somewhat limited as to with whom they are
permitted to negotiate.126 Public managed care plans, such as Medicaid, for example,
are outside of the scope of parties subject to this statute.127
Perhaps one of the most attractive aspects of this Texas statute is its inherent
safeguards, which should prove to prevent physicians from abusing their newly
granted power to jointly negotiate contract terms. Initially, the attorney general must
determine that the health benefit plan with which the group of physicians intends to
negotiate maintains substantial market power in a service area and has the capacity to
adversely affect the quality and availability of patient care.128 Further, physician
groups are prohibited from negotiating certain contract terms, such as the fees or
prices for services, the amount of any discounts to be granted on services rendered,
and the dollar amount of capitation129 or fixed payment for health services rendered
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See David Koenig, Texas Takes the Lead on Doctor Bargaining, HOUS. CHRON., June
22, 1999, at 1C.
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See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 29.01-29.14 (West 1999).
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§ 29.09; see also 1999 Legislative Compendium, supra note 120.
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TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 29.07 (West 1999); see also 1999 Legislative Compendium,
supra note 120.
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TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 29.09 (West 1999); see also 1999 Legislative Compendium,
supra note 120.
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TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 29.03 (West 1999).
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by physicians to health benefit plan enrollees.130 Perhaps most importantly, this
Texas statute expressly prohibits physicians from engaging in strikes, boycotts, or
reductions in the provision of health care services.131 It thereby lays to rest what is
perhaps the greatest fear of those who are against collective negotiating by
physicians, namely that of hospitals being completely devoid of physicians when
they or their loved ones are in need of medical treatment.
While the true merits of Texas’s answer to the great imbalance of bargaining
power between independent physicians and insurance companies or HMOs has yet to
undergo the test of time, it seems on its face to be a reasonable and potentially
effective solution. This statute enables physicians, who might traditionally be
referred to as independent contractors, to unite to increase their bargaining power in
contract negotiations.132 Yet, at the same time, it limits the percentage of physicians
in a specialty who can legally unite to jointly negotiate with HMOs and expressly
forbids walk-outs or strikes.133 Thus, the statute seems to be a fairly effective
compromise, enabling physicians to gain additional bargaining power and control
over the treatment of their patients, while preventing them from amassing too much
power or threatening accessibility to health care services.
While arguably preferable to a total lack of legislative action on any level, it
seems apparent that the current evils inherent to the antitrust laws could more
efficiently be combated through the enactment of federal legislation. While anticompetitive agreements and restraints of trade within the health care industry are
likely to have their greatest impact on the local level, the federal antitrust laws are
likely to be their principal sources of opposition. State laws in this area can
essentially be viewed as supplementary, as they can impose greater restrictions upon
state citizens but not grant immunity from liability under the federal laws.134 For
example, the requirements under the Texas statute are actually more restrictive than
those provided in the Policy Statement of the FTC and DOJ. As such, logic dictates
that any substantial changes in the antitrust laws, such as providing an exemption for
independently practicing physicians, should properly be made at the federal level.
C. Viable Option 3: Amend the Federal Antitrust Laws
The most effective way to combat the imbalance of power within the health care
industry would undoubtedly be to simply amend the current federal antitrust laws.
Representative Tom Campbell from California has recently sponsored a Bill,
commonly referred to as the “Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 1999,”
[hereinafter “QHCCA”] intended to:
ensure and foster continued patient safety and quality of care by making
the antitrust laws apply to negotiations between groups of health care
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§ 29.10 (providing in pertinent part: “[n]othing contained in this chapter shall be
construed to enable physicians to jointly coordinate any cessation, reduction, or limitation of
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professionals and health plans and health insurance issuers in the same
manner as such laws apply to collective bargaining by labor organizations
under the National Labor Relations Act.135
Essentially, this Bill, if enacted, would allow independent physicians who unite for
contract negotiation purposes to be treated as employees, rather than as independent
contractors, employers, managerial employees, or supervisors, thereby permitting
them to evade antitrust liability.136 This proposed exemption from federal antitrust
law seems to be intended to allow physicians to match the bargaining power of
HMOs in contract negotiations and to have a greater say in the proper course of
treatment for their patients.137 The bill, also referred to as H.R. 1304, was
cosponsored by 137 members of Congress138 and has already been presented to the
House Judiciary Committee.139
This legislation has been described as a response to the heavy handed negotiating
tactics of health insurers, that already benefit from preferential treatment under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, which has come to characterize the American health care
industry.140 This imbalance of bargaining power leads to health care providers being
forced to succumb to restrictive contractual terms, which are often proffered on a
“take-it-or-leave-it” basis, under the threat of being removed from the health plan’s
physician list or being denied access to its patients.141 Proponents of H.R. 1304
maintain that medical professionals should be permitted to unite to collectively
bargain with insurers to obtain the best possible contract terms, allowing market
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Suhail Khan, Thamas, at <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c106:1:./temp?~
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Relations Act. Suhail Khan, at Thamas, <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d106:
HR01304:@@@D&summ2=m&>.
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See Suhail Khan, Thamas, at <http://www.house.gov/campbell>. The purpose of H.R.
1304 is to improve the health care industry by allowing medical professionals, such as doctors,
pharmacists, and nurses, to collectively bargain in contract negotiations with HMO’s and other
health care issuers. Suhail Khan, Thamas, at <http://www.house.gov/campbell/leg.htm.> In
describing the desired effect of this legislation on the health care system, Congressman
Campbell has stated, “(i)t is my strong belief that patients will be better served when fair and
equitable contracts are negotiated by professionals, acting together, who are closest to the
needs of their patients. First on the list of contractual terms that healthcare professionals will
demand in these negotiations is a greater right to prescribe and care for patients as they see
fit.” Id.
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forces, rather than the federal government, to specify the parameters of the health
care provider-insurer relationship.142
In describing this proposed legislation, Congressman Campbell has stated:
this legislation is the best way to let the market deal with the complaints
so many health care professionals have raised with HMOs. Health care
professionals, including physicians, nurses, pharmacists, dentists and
midwives, should be given the option to form their own professional
associations and bargain with the HMOs in their service area. This will
ensure that all health care professionals will be able to secure contracts of
a fair and equitable nature, and the patients will be better served.143
He maintains that allowing medical professionals, including physicians, pharmacists
and nurses, to bargain together in contract negotiations with health care issuers such
as HMOs, will serve to improve our nation’s health care system by returning a
greater right to control the course of treatment to the medical professionals who the
needs of their patients.144
While this proposed legislation has received substantial support, it has also been
met by considerable opposition. Among those opposed to its enactment is the
Antitrust Division of the DOJ, which has expressed its collective belief that its
enactment would serve to harm consumers of health care in the long run.145 In his
statement concerning H.R. 1304 before the House Judiciary Committee, Joel Klein,
Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division of the DOJ, maintained that this
legislation would serve to destroy the free-market competition that is essential to our
nation’s economic vitality and has yielded the benefits of innovation, increased
choice, and the lessening of prices for services.146 He also argued that the chief
arguments of the supporters of this Bill are unfounded and inadequate to justify its
enactment.147 Specifically, he maintained that: the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not
provide insurers with unfair market leverage or exempt their activities from antitrust
scrutiny; the relative bargaining power of HMOs varies significantly across markets
and does not stifle competition to the extent that Bill supporters maintain; and that
the Bill provides no assurances that the collective bargaining efforts of health care
professionals will yield a higher quality of care, rather than simply fattening their
own pockets.148
It seems that the position of the DOJ is that this proposed Bill would have a
drastically adverse economic effect upon consumers. It maintains that medical
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professionals will undoubtedly increase their fees significantly, should they be
granted the ability to unite to jointly negotiate with insurers without regard to the
antitrust laws.149 It further speculates that this would produce a sort of snowball
effect, driving up insurance prices, increasing costs for Medicare and Medicaid, and
ultimately harming the consumer.150 It also maintains that the resulting higher
premiums will cause the percentage of citizens without insurance to greatly increase
and lead many employers to either stop offering health insurance coverage to their
employees or to decrease their benefits.151 The DOJ argument seems to be primarily
financial, and dependent upon the warrantless assumption that health care
professionals would use the increased bargaining power that the Bill would provide
to substantially increase their incomes at the ultimate expense of their patients.
One of the most adamant supporters of H.R. 1304 is the American Medical
Association [hereinafter “AMA”].152 In his statement before the House Judiciary
Committee in support of this Bill, E. Ratclifffe Anderson, Jr., M.D., Executive V.P.
and C.E.O. of the AMA, expressed that this legislation was critically necessary to
rectify the myriad of problems currently inherent to the health care system in this
country.153 In particular, it was proposed that the current antitrust laws, coupled with
the enforcement policy of the DOJ and FTC, are too restrictive on physicians,
actually deterring them from engaging in pro-competitive behavior and unreasonably
restraining their ability to stand up to health plans.154 Dr. Anderson maintains that
the enactment of this Bill would serve to restore the balance of power in health care
contract negotiations in favor of adequate representation and appropriate treatment of
patients.155 In addition, he opined that the uniqueness of the health care industry,
which is already substantially regulated by the government, justifies this limited
modification of the antitrust laws reserved solely for that industry.156
The crux of the AMA argument seems to be that it is actually the patients, or
health care consumers, who would be the ultimate beneficiaries of the enactment of
this Bill. It is proposed that the increased bargaining power that it would grant to
physicians would enable them to resume greater control over the treatment
administered to their patients.157 Since treating physicians are naturally in a better
position to determine which types of treatment are most appropriate for their
patients, the quality of care which could be provided would be substantially
improved.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Definitive action is needed to clarify the scope of antitrust liability as it applies to
independently practicing physicians and to level the playing field between physicians
and MCPs. Under the current antitrust laws, physicians are bullied by massive
health care providers that dominate health care markets. They have lost affirmative
control over the ultimate administration of care of their patients. While there may be
no perfect solution to the imbalance of power that has come to characterize health
care in America, the QHCCA is most attractive proposal to date. In any event,
federal legislation must be enacted to amend the current antitrust laws to allow for
limited scale unionization or collusion between independent practitioners to
collectively negotiate contract terms with MCPs.
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